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GROUPING THE MARCELLUS PAYOUT: USE OF CLASS
ACTIONS IN ROYALTY LITIGATION CONCERNING
POST-PRODUCTION COST DEDUCTIONS
KAREN E. KAHLE* AND DENIELLE M. STRITCH**

ABSTRACT
As drilling and operations in the Marcellus, Utica, Bakken, and other
United States shales increase across the country, so naturally does litigation
between those owning the land and minerals, and those producing them.
This Article will outline the growing trends that entitle lessors to royalties
without any deduction of production or transportation costs, as well as the
parallel application of these principles to establish commonality for class
certification of lessors. Regardless of the differences between drilling,
leases, and pooling agreements in the shale context, Appalachian
jurisdictions are likely to hold the course and continue examining royalty
issues, and class certification of those issues, as liberally as they have in
other contexts. Part II of this Article will address royalty payments and cost
deductions in state courts through the present, focusing on how courts have
handled similar disputes in the past. Part III of this Article will outline the
general processes needed to certify a class. Part IV will examine the
commonality requirement of class certification more thoroughly, and Part V
will review that commonality requirement in the context of landowner
royalty disputes. Part VI of this Article will examine how courts have
addressed contract-based class actions. Finally, Part VII will argue that as
landowner, royalty, and cost deduction disputes arise in the context of the
shales, courts are likely to apply the implied covenant to market against any
lessee and find commonality where leases bear similar language, subjecting
the lessee to such a covenant.

* Karen E. Kahle is a Member of Steptoe & Johnson PLLC, where she has practiced as a
litigator, primarily in West Virginia and Ohio, for the past twenty-two years.
** Denielle M. Stritch is an Associate of Steptoe & Johnson PLLC, also practicing in the
litigation department throughout West Virginia.
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INTRODUCTION

Recently, the Appalachian states have seen remarkable growth in
natural gas drilling in the Marcellus and Utica shales. These shales are
geological formations of accumulated sediment, buried millions of years
ago and compressed to produce the shale.1 It is well known that the
Marcellus is rich in fossil fuels, but until technology caught up with desire,
there was no practical way of accessing the natural gas trapped within this
formation.2 However, with the advent of technology came the ability to
access, produce, and profit from the natural gas in the Marcellus.3 A
similar “rush” is underway with the Utica shale, another gas, and potentially
oil rich, shale formation located on the western side of the Appalachian
Basin.4 Similar to the Utica and Marcellus shales, the Bakken shale,
located largely in North Dakota, and other various shale formations
throughout the country, are experiencing similar “rushes.”5 As shale
production and leasing activities increase, courts are likely to see an influx
in issues not previously addressed in-depth. Because of these changes in
extraction in the shales, new twists on legal issues as to ownership and
royalty rights are cropping up more often. Oil and gas companies are
seeing new problems arise in their leasing structures, practices, production
methods, and royalty payouts. Landowners are clashing with these
companies in new and unique ways.
One particular area courts are likely to be pulled into battles between
landowners (lessors) and drilling companies (lessees) is royalty payment
calculations and post-production cost allocation.6 In particular, landowners
are bringing more claims alleging that lessees are engaging in a common
pattern of miscalculating the royalty payments owed under leasing
agreements, which are often payments under pooling agreements.7 These
1. See Kristen Allen, The Big Fracking Deal: Marcellus Shale – Pennsylvania’s Untapped
Resource, 23 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 51, 54 n.26 (2012).
2. See id. at 54-55.
3. See id at 55.
4. See generally Stephanie Karisny, Hydraulic Fracturing in Michigan: Reassessing State
Regulations in Light of New Drilling in the Collingood and Utica Shales, 57 WAYNE L. REV. 627
(2011).
5. See Christopher S. Kulander, Environmental Effects of Petroleum Production: 2010-2011
Texas Legislative Developments, 44 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 863, 881 (2012) (“The problems being
heard by the Eagle Ford Task Force are analogous to another shale gas boom currently underway
in remote and sparsely populated western North Dakota wherein the Bakken Shale is found.”).
See generally Karisny, supra note 4.
6. See infra Part II.E.
7. Randy M. Awdish, Wolverine Gold Rush? A Primer on the Utica/Collingwood Shale and
Gas Lease Issues, 38 MICH. REAL PROP. REV. 64, 70 (2011) (“A typical lease will contain a
provision allowing the lessee the right to consolidate or ‘pool’ the leased premises with adjoining
premises.”).
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landowners are likely to band together and attempt to certify a class to
maximize the impact of the litigation, especially when common patterns of
miscalculations are alleged and/or payments under pooling agreements are
in dispute. Similar claims have been brought for many years, involving
leases for vertical well drilling.8 As a result, courts will need to determine
whether the previous analytical frameworks will apply to these new leasing
arrangements, and if so, which of many rationales best fits this situation.
While horizontal drilling in the various shales across the country has
exploded and litigation related to the drilling process of the oil and gas
interests involved has dramatically increased, courts need not reinvent the
wheel to resolve royalty calculation or cost allocation disputes between
lessors and lessees. Nor must they start from scratch in determining
whether lessors involved in horizontal drilling may bring a class action
against a lessee. This Article will show that, while differences may be
necessary within leasing arrangements due to the nature of natural gas
extraction from the shales, these differences do not alter the analysis for
approaching class certification.9 This Article will outline the growing
trends that entitle lessors to royalties without any deduction of production
or transportation costs, as well as the parallel application of these principles
to establish commonality for class certification of lessors. Regardless of the
differences between drilling, leases, and pooling agreements in the shale
context, Appalachian jurisdictions are likely to hold the course and continue
examining royalty issues and class certification of those issues as liberally
as they have in other contexts.
Part I of this Article will address royalty payments and cost deductions
in state courts through the present, focusing on how courts have handled
similar disputes in the past. Part II of this Article will outline the general
requirements needed to certify a class. Part III will examine the
commonality requirement of class certification more thoroughly, and Part
IV will review that commonality requirement in the context of landowner
royalty disputes. Part V of this Article will examine how courts have
addressed contract-based class actions. Finally, Part VI predicts that as
landowner royalty and cost deduction disputes arise in the context of the
shales, courts are likely to apply the implied covenant to market against
lessees and find commonality where leases bear similar language subjecting
the lessee to such a covenant.

8. See infra Parts II.E, V.
9. See infra Parts II.E, III.
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II. ROYALTY PAYMENTS AND COST DEDUCTIONS: HOW WE
GOT WHERE WE ARE
This Article will focus on fairly specific types of lawsuits and the
contexts in which they arise – generally, related to extraction of natural gas
from underground formations by one party to a lease (the lessee) with the
property’s owner (the lessor). Prior to getting into those issues, however, it
is essential to understand, in very general terms, the relevant property
ownership principles, natural gas extraction techniques, recent
technological advancements resulting in changes to those techniques, and
how those changes may affect property rights.
A. OWNERSHIP OF SUBSURFACE MINERALS
Unlike virtually any other country in the world, in the United States,
individuals (as opposed to the government) may own subsurface minerals.10
Even in our country’s beginning, individuals have been laying claim to
property. Ultimately, the law developed so the owner of the surface of land
in America also held all rights to the subsurface, straight down to the center
of the earth.11 While the nuances of property law may vary from state to
state, this general principle is true across the board.12 Complete ownership
of an entire tract of property is generally known as fee simple.13
As the years went by and less unclaimed property remained, states and
localities began to develop methods for giving notice of ownership details
to all others and proving ownership of real property. Today, property
ownership, rights, and interests are typically recorded in the office of the
county clerk where the property lies. These recorded interests include
mineral leases, which notify the public that if a stated individual or entity
owns the oil and gas interests underlying a given property, another
individual or entity has contracted to produce the oil and gas.14
B. HISTORY OF MINERAL EXTRACTION IN AMERICA
For centuries before our country was formed, it was known that the
subsurface of land contained minerals, primarily coal, oil, and gas, which
were useful for the creation of light and energy. By the mid-1800s, efforts
10. See generally McCormick v. Union Pac. Res. Co., 14 P.3d 346, 346 (Colo. 2000).
11. Id. See generally Stuart S. Ball, The Vertical Extent of Ownership in Land, 76 U. PA. L.
REV. 631, 684-89 (1928).
12. C.C. Marvel, Annotation, Oil and Gas as “Minerals” Within Deed, Lease, or Licenses,
37 A.L.R. 2D 1440, 1441-42 (1954); see also Ball, supra note 11, at 689.
13. 31 C.J.S. Estates § 12 (2012).
14. See generally LARRY L. SKEEN, OIL & GAS LAW OF KENTUCKY, VIRGINIA, AND WEST
VIRGINIA §§ 3:1-3:6 (1994).
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were underway in this country to reach and extract these underground
minerals, using drilling and extraction techniques that have been modified
and refined over the years.15 As those involved in mineral extraction (now
known as producers) became more experienced, particular geographic
regions were identified as being rich sources of oil and/or natural gas. For
example, mid-continent states, like Texas, Kansas, and Arkansas were areas
found to be rich in oil, while large amounts of coal were found in
Appalachian states, like West Virginia. Often the fee simple owner would
have no interest in, nor the ability to extract, any coal, oil, or gas that may
exist on his property. Thus, fee simple owners began severing or selling off
various factions of their property to those better equipped to profit from
ownership of those minerals. As severances and changes in property
ownership occurred, notices of ownership and rights were filed in local
records. As time passed, technologies for extraction of oil and natural gas
improved, and property ownership became more and more complicated. In
addition, beginning in the early part of the twentieth century, the
government began regulating natural gas development and distribution,
among other things in the industry.16
Originally, drilling into the subsurface to extract oil and gas simply
went straight now into the earth, using percussion technology in the early
1800s and progressing to rotary drilling by the mid-nineteenth century.17
Early in the twentieth century, producers began using directional or slant
drilling on occasions when surface use directly above the formation sought
to be explored and produced was not consistent with placement of a well.18
In keeping with the theory of property ownership that the fee simple tract
went straight down to the center of the earth, directional drilling presaged
the potential for trespass and conversion of minerals from unowned or
unleased property.19
This early technology allowed slant drilled wells to angle but without
much curve.20 It could take as much as two thousand feet for a vertical
slant well to become horizontal. With improvements in technology, the

15. Where is Crude Oil Produced, CONSUMER ENERGY REPORT, http://www.consumer
energyreport.com/research/crude-oil/where-oil-is-produced/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2012).
16. See The History of Regulation, NATURALGAS, http://naturalgas.org/regulation/
history.asp (last visited Feb. 1, 2013).
17. See Oil Drilling, SCIENCE CLARIFIED, http://www.scienceclarified.com/Mu-Oi/OilDrilling html (last visited Oct. 19, 2012).
18. See Directional and Horizontal Drilling, NATURALGAS, http://www naturalgas.org/
naturalgas/extraction_directional.asp (last visited Oct. 19, 2012).
19. Id.; Ball, supra note 11, 684-89.
20. Thomas E. Stimson, Jr., Oil Drillers Throw Curves, POPULAR MECHANICS, Jan. 1950, at
161-64.
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curves were tightened. Today, wellbores can more readily and quickly go
from vertical to horizontal, allowing one well access to potentially
thousands of acres of subsurface formations, not just those formations
directly under the well.21
C. OIL AND NATURAL GAS LEASES
Leasing of oil and gas rights by producers, as opposed to the outright
purchase of mineral estates, has become much more prevalent. In its most
basic sense, an oil and gas lease is a contract between the mineral owner,
known as the lessor, who may or may not also be the surface owner, and an
individual or entity, known as the lessee.22 Ideally, oil and gas leases
describe and set forth all material provisions in a way which is acceptable
and agreeable to both lessee and lessor.23 As a practical matter, however,
this is rarely the case.24 When disputes arise between the parties to an oil
and gas lease, the parties, and the courts, must turn to regulatory, statutory,
and common law to fill in the gaps in resolving their disputes.25
D. BASIC LEASE PROVISIONS
It is impossible to include terms for all potential disputes between
lessors and lessees. However, following are some basic provisions found in
most oil and gas leases. The subsections below outline common provisions
in mineral leases, including term, leased premises, delay rental, royalty, and
pooling.
1.

Term

The “term” of a lease defines the periods of time and conditions under
which a lease remains valid.26 Most oil and gas leases have both a primary
term and a secondary term.27 The primary term is typically a fixed number
of years and generally requires no production or exploration activity on the
part of the lessee for the lease to remain valid.28 On the other hand, the
secondary term is the period following the conclusion of the primary term
21. NATURALGAS, supra note 18.
22. Douglas Hah Gross, Annotation, What Constitutes Reasonably Necessary Use at the
Surface of the Leasehold by a Mineral Owner, Lessor, or Driller Under an Oil and Gas Lease or
Drilling Contract, 53 A.L.R. 3D 16, 24-42 (1973).
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. Awdish, supra note 7, at 69.
27. Mohan Kelkar, The Effect of the Cessation of Production Clause During the Secondary
Term of an Oil and Gas Lease, 22 TULSA L.J. 531, 532 (1987).
28. Id. at 533.
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and defines the circumstances under which the lease shall remain in force
and effect.29 A typical term provision in an oil and gas lease may read as
follows: “This lease shall remain in force and effect for a [primary] term of
– years (or months) and as long thereafter as substances covered by the
lease are produced [secondary term].”30 Courts generally agree that if the
condition described for taking the lease into the secondary term is not met,
the lease expires.31
2.

Leased Premises

The lease should contain a full and complete legal description of the
real property that is subject to the lease.32 This description is often carried
over from lease to lease as ownership and leasing rights change hands.33
The description often includes metes and bounds language to help pinpoint
the property’s boundaries.34
3.

Delay Rental

A lessee usually need not explore or produce under a lease during its
primary term.35 Instead, a lease often includes a provision for payment of
delay rentals to the lessor.36 Consideration is then typically paid at the end
of each year of the primary term in which no production has taken place.37
4.

Royalty

Usually, the primary consideration for a lessor under an oil and gas
lease is reservation of a royalty interest in all minerals produced under the
lease.38 This is typically expressed as a fraction or percentage, usually
29. Id.
30. See generally Checklist for Oil/Gas/Mineral Leases, MICH. FARM BUREAU,
http://www michfb.com/ecology/minerals (last visited Nov. 10, 2012).
31. See generally Kelkar, supra note 27, at 532-37; see also MICH. FARM BUREAU, supra
note 30.
32. See generally SKEEN, supra note 14, § 3:31.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See 55A TEX. JUR. 3D Oil and Gas § 344 (2012).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. 38 AM. JUR. 2D Gas and Oil § 195 (2010). The various definitions of royalty include:
an agreed return paid for oil or gas reduced to possession and taken from the leased
premises; a share of the profits or proceeds from gas and oil operations; the
landowner’s share of production, free of the expenses of production; that fractional
interest in the production of oil or gas created by the owner of land, either by
reservation when the mineral lease was entered into, or by direct grant to a third
person; payment from the lessee oil production company to the lessor-landowner for
oil extracted from the lessor’s property; or the compensation provided in the lease for
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between an eighth and a quarter of the price received by the lessee from sale
of oil or gas produced.39 Disputes concerning calculation of royalty
payments, including whether any of the post-production costs are taken
from the reserved royalty interest, will be a major focus of this Article.40
5.

Pooling

If the lessee anticipates combining the leased tract with other leased
tracts for the purpose of forming a larger, single development unit, the lease
may contain a provision defining how such “pooling” can occur, as well as
how it will be reflected in royalty calculations.41 In addition to provisions
in individual leases, a number of states have laws regulating pooling.42
Pooling has become more common as horizontal drilling technology has
developed, because horizontal drilling often requires lessees to traverse the
mineral interests of multiple lessors.43
This Article is most concerned with the disputes arising between
lessors and lessees when lessees deduct post-production costs from lessor
royalties.44 As a practical matter, because most lessees are companies that
make the drilling of oil or natural gas their business, it would be impractical
for each company to write and execute a new, unique lease from scratch
with every one of its lessors. Consequently, such companies often use form
leases under which a significant number of the terms and provisions are

the privilege of drilling for, and producing, oil and gas, and consisting of a share of the
oil and gas produced or the profits therefrom but not a perpetual interest in the realty.
A “royalty interest” means a property interest created in oil and gas, and its owner is
entitled to a share of production, if, as and when there is production, free of the costs
of production.
Id. (citing Ramming v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am., 390 F.3d 366 (5th Cir. 2004) (referring
to Texas law); CIG Exploration, Inc. v. Hill, 824 F. Supp. 1532 (D. Utah 1993), judgment aff’d,
83 F.3d 431 (10th Cir. 1996); Texaco, Inc. v. Pigott, 235 F. Supp. 458 (S.D. Miss. 1964),
judgment aff’d, 358 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1966); Baxley v. State, 958 P.2d 422 (Alaska 1998);
Swaim v. Stephens Prod. Co., 196 S.W.3d 5 (Ark. 2004); Armstrong Petrol. Corp. v. Tri-Valley
Oil & Gas Co., 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 412 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004); Simson v. Langholf, 293 P.2d 302
(Colo. 1956); Hilliard v. Amoco Prod. Co., 688 So. 2d 1176 (La. Ct. App. 1996); Davis v.
Hardman, 133 S.E.2d 77 (W. Va. 1963); Mittelstaedt v. Santa Fe Minerals, 954 P.2d 1203 (Okla.
1998); Cartwright v. Cologne Prod. Co., 182 S.W.3d 438 (Tex. App. Corpus Christi 2006)).
39. Byron C. Keeling & Karolyn King Gillespie, The First Marketable Product Doctrine:
Just What Is the “Product”?, 37 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1, 2 (2005).
40. See infra Parts II.E, V.
41. Awdish, supra note 7, at 70; Oil and Gas Pooling: How it Works and How Forced
Pooling Affects the Owner, OIL-GAS-LEASES, http://www.oil-gas-leases.com/oil-gas-pooling.html
(last visited Oct. 21, 2012).
42. See generally E. H. Schopler, Annotation, Validity of Compulsory Pooling or Unitization
Statute or Ordinance Requiring Owners or Lessees of Oil and Gas Lands to Develop Their
Holdings as a Single Drilling Unit and the Like, 37 A.L.R. 2D 434 (1954).
43. See generally OIL-GAS-LEASES, supra note 41.
44. See infra Parts II.E, V.
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exactly the same or substantially similar from lease to lease.45 In such
leases, the royalty clauses usually include a method for calculation of the
royalty fraction reserved; however, royalty interests are not always
protected within the other provisions of the lease.46 In such cases, courts
have stepped in to apply “implied covenants,” which require a lessee to
adhere to certain obligations for marketing or producing the gas drilled.47
An implied covenant to market generally requires a lessee to operate for the
common good of both parties where marketable quantities of gas have been
found.48 Often, reliance on implied covenants benefits the lessor because
the lessee is obligated to market; therefore, post-production costs are largely
its own responsibility. However, even when a lessor’s royalty rights are
protected by lease provision, implied covenant, or other circumstances, the
lessors often feel that a lessee is not providing the proper payments and
address this concern through litigation.
E. ROYALTY PAYMENTS AND PRODUCTION COSTS: THE ARGUMENT
Regardless of lease terms and parties’ understandings of royalty
calculations prior to drilling, disputes inevitably arise regarding: (1) how
royalty payments are calculated, (2) the point at which production costs
become transmission costs, and (3) who is responsible for these expenses.
By and large, two schools of thought have formed to assess these costs: the
“marketable product” rule and the “at the wellhead” rule. How courts have
historically assessed this calculation can affect not only the value of a
lessor’s royalty, but also its impact on certification of a class action.

45. See Assignment of Oil and Gas Leases Texas Form, MONEYINOIL,
http://moneyinoil.com/legalform25 html last visited Oct. 21, 2012) (providing a sample oil and
gas form).
46. See Iams v. Carnegie Natural Gas Co., 45 A. 54, 55 (Pa. 1899).
47. Id.
48. Id. In Iams, the following royalty clause was included in the lease:
In consideration of said grant and demise the said party of the second part agrees to
give or to pay to the said parties of the first part the full equal one-eighth part of all the
oil produced or saved from the premises, and to deliver the same, free of expense, into
tanks or pipe lines, to the credit of the first parties; and, should gas be found in
sufficient quantities to justify marketing the same, the consideration in full to the
parties of the first part shall be five hundred ($500) dollars per annum, payable semiannually in advance, for the gas from each well, so long as it shall be sold therefrom,
and gas free of cost, for household use on the premises, to be taken from a well on
same.
Id. at 54. Based on this language, a jury held that the lessee obtained sufficient quantities of gas to
justify marketing so that, once obtained, lessee was obligated to “operate for the common good of
both parties, and to pay the rent or royalty reserved.” See id. at 55.
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At the Wellhead

Jurisdictions adhering to an “at the wellhead” royalty payments and
production costs are spearheaded by Texas courts. In essence, this rule
grants a lessor claim to a royalty payment when gas arrives “at the
wellhead,” at which point it is converted from real property to personal
property.49 This means the royalty percentage is valued at the point at
which the gas is severed from the wellhead – all costs after that point are
post-production costs, which can be deducted from a lessor’s royalty
payment.50 In making this determination, courts do not consider the quality
of the product, but instead are only concerned with the location. 51 While an
implied duty to market is sometimes addressed in the sense that the lessee is
obligated to obtain a good price, it is not the basis for the calculation
assessment.52
Although a significant number of courts have moved away from such a
strict linguistic construction, a lease bearing the language “at the well” or
“at the wellhead” warrants at least a cursory review of this calculation
method.53 Historically, courts have placed great weight on the use of the
language – and accordingly, more production cost responsibility – on the
lessor.54 As shale leases are entered, a lessee using this language must
consider whether use of “at the wellhead” language will allow them to
apply post-production costs against royalty percentages. Similarly, a lessee
will have to consider whether using that language will allow it to apply
costs against royalties in a pooling agreement, where theoretically, all
royalties are treated equally. Unfortunately, the trend is leading away from
use of the “at the wellhead” rule and toward prohibiting application of postproduction costs against lessors’ royalty interest.55
2.

Marketable Product

Jurisdictions applying the marketable product rule for royalty
calculation rely heavily on the existence of a lessee’s implied covenant to
market.56 In essence, this duty requires a lessee to obtain the best price

49. Keeling & Gillespie, supra note 39, 2-3.
50. Id.; Brian S. Wheeler, Deducting Post-Production Costs When Calculating Royalty:
What Does the Lease Provide?, 8 APPALACHIAN J.L. 1, 5 (2008).
51. See Keeling & Gillespie, supra note 39, at 4.
52. See id. at 4-5.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 5.
56. Rachel M. Kirk, Variations in the Marketable-Product Rule from State to State, 60
OKLA. L. REV. 769, 774 (2007).
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possible on marketable quantities of gas.57 The marketable product rule
obligates a lessee to bear all costs incurred in making gas “marketable,”
pursuant to this implied covenant.58 Obviously, this rule is much more
beneficial to the lessor than to the lessee, as a lessor’s royalty will be much
larger where costs are not applied to his retained interest. This rule is
followed in a number of traditional oil and gas states, notably Arkansas59
and Kansas.60 Kansas courts have explained that the implied covenant to
market instills a duty on the lessee to prepare the drilled gas for market.61
Accordingly, the costs associated with that duty are also borne by the
lessee, not the lessor.62 When applied in fact, even where royalty payments
are to be paid at the wellhead in accordance with a lease term, the lessee
may not deduct transportation or compression costs from that payment.63
Of the Appalachian states, West Virginia courts have discussed this
issue most extensively. West Virginia has essentially prohibited any
deductions of post-extraction costs from the lessor’s royalty payment.64
This rule is applied very liberally and always in favor of the lessor. As
such, unless a lease includes an express provision that the calculation of a
royalty payment requires the deduction of costs past the point of extraction,
a lessor is entitled to a royalty percentage that does not reflect these
expenses.65 And even in that case, a lessee may end up covering all costs.
In particular, in Estate of Tawney v. Columbia Natural Resources, LLC,66 a
class action suit brought by lessors claiming insufficient royalty payments,
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that “at the well” type
phrases were not sufficient to allow lessees to shift post-production costs
onto lessors.67 This plainly exemplifies the liberal, pro-lessor view of oil
and gas lease analysis in Appalachia.
It seems courts are trending toward the marketable product rule when
assessing the validity of royalty calculations, so the prudent lessee in a shale

57. Id. (citing Mittelstaedt v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc., 954 P.2d 1203, 1211 (Okla. 1998)).
58. Id. at 775 (citing MAURICE H. MERRILL, COVENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL AND GAS LEASES
§ 85, at 214-15 (2d ed. 1940)).
59. See generally Clear Creek Oil & Gas Co. v. Bushmiaer, 264 S.W. 830 (Ark. 1924)
(holding the prices prevailing at the nearest place gas can be sold is market value, and the lessee
bears the transportation and distributing charges); Hanna Oil & Gas Co. v. Taylor, 759 S.W.2d
563 (Ark. 1988) (holding lessee could not deduct costs of compressing gas for delivery).
60. See generally Gilmore v. Superior Oil Co., 388 P.2d 602 (Kan. 1964).
61. Id. at 606-07.
62. Id.
63. See id.
64. Estate of Tawney v. Columbia Natural Res., LLC, 633 S.E.2d 22, 30 (W. Va. 2006).
65. Wellman v. Energy Res. Inc., 557 S.E.2d 254, 265 (W. Va. 2001).
66. 633 S.E.2d 22 (W. Va. 2006).
67. Estate of Tawney, 633 S.E.2d at 30.

2012]

GROUPING THE MARCELLUS PAYOUT

711

region should assume it will be held responsible for post-production costs.68
Contractual language to the contrary may help share the burden with lessors
in some states. However, fact that covenants to market are being more
readily implied demonstrates that royalty calculation decisions are trending
in favor of lessors.
III. CLASS CERTIFICATION
Lessees may have multiple leases out for drilling in multiple locations
at any given time, and courts are often asked to certify a class of lessors and
allow uniform decision of the royalty-payment issue across that class.69
Courts in such circumstances must determine whether such lessors and their
claims are situated such that a class should be certified. Certification
requirements are relatively uniform across the oil-rich regions, but
assessment of those requirements is not. As companies lease more and
more property for the purposes of horizontal drilling, courts will
undoubtedly have to decide whether or not to certify lessor-classes claiming
that a company has not properly issued royalty payments across the board.
Determining how courts are likely to assess class certification motions in
the future requires an examination of the class action certification process,
as well as how courts have applied that process in similar situations.
Class actions arose as a useful form of pleading because they allow a
large group of plaintiffs to bring suit against a single person or entity with
hopes of resolving the same or very similar concerns.70 In order to be
certified as a class action, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as
well as under the majority of state rules, a class must satisfy both Rule 23(a)
and (b).71 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) states:
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as
representative parties on behalf of all members only if: (1) the
class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable;
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the

68. Kirk, supra note 56, at 780 (explaining Wyoming, Michigan, Nevada, Arkansas, Kansas,
Colorado, West Virginia, and Oklahoma have adopted the marketable product approach); see also
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.61503(b) (West 2012); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 522.115(b)
(West 2011); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-304 (2012).
69. See generally SEECO v. Hales, 22 S.W.3d 157 (Ark. 2000); Shockey v. Chevron U.S.A.,
No. 98,063 (Okla. Ct. App. Apr. 4, 2003) (not for publication); Duhe v. Texaco, Inc., 779 So. 2d
1070 (La. Ct. App. 2001); John B. McArthur, The Class Action Tool in Oilfield Litigation, 45 U.
KAN. L. REV. 113 (1996).
70. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s notes.
71. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)-(b).
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claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.72
The requirements of this rule are generally referred to as numerosity,
typicality, commonality, and adequate representation.73 If a court finds that
numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequate representation have been
met, it must then determine the type of the class.74 Under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23, there are three types:
(b) Types of Class Actions. A class action may be maintained if
Rule 23(a) is satisfied and if:
(1) prosecuting separate actions by or against individual class
members would create a risk of:
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual
class members that would establish incompatible standards of
conduct for the party opposing the class; or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual class members that, as
a practical matter, would be dispositive of the interests of the other
members not parties to the individual adjudications or would
substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their
interests;
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on
grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive
relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting
the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to
class members predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other
available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy. The matters pertinent to these findings include:
(A) the class members’ interests in individually controlling the
prosecution or defense of separate actions;
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the
controversy already begun by or against class members;
(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation
of the claims in the particular forum; and

72. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (emphasis added).
73. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613 (1997).
74. Id.
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(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.75
Certification under Rule 23(b)(1) and/or (2) is typically requested when
equitable relief – primarily, a class-wide injunction – is sought.76 When
damages – money – are sought, certification under Rule 23(b)(3) is
typically requested.77 Almost universally, lessors seeking class certification
in royalty dispute actions seek money damages and thus, certification under
Rule 23(b)(3).78
The majority of states have based their class action legislation on
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, with several adopting the relevant
provisions in their entirety. This includes the Appalachian states (West
Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Ohio), and traditional oil and gas states (Texas,
Oklahoma, Kansas, and Arkansas).79 While courts must address all
certification requirements when a class action motion is made, this Article
will focus on the commonality analysis, under both Rule 23(a) and (b)(3),
among lessors claiming improper calculation of royalty payments. In
essence, in order to produce the oil and gas underlying any given surface, a
company must own or lease one hundred percent of the oil and gas interests
underlying that property.80 Accordingly, a company is likely to have many
leases taken out on many different tracts of land at any given time.
In addition, a court considering a certification motion must ensure that
the commonality between class members’ claims predominates over any
individual claims the members may have.81 As a result, methods used by
individual courts to determine, commonality are important. How courts
have handled this determination and what facts each court is willing to
consider, play a large part in whether or not commonality is found to be
sufficient.
IV. THE COURT’S COMMONALITY ASSESSMENT
Courts typically set a low threshold for finding commonality in most
requests for class certification.82 Predominance of those common issues, at
75. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b).
76. Amchem Prods., Inc., 521 U.S. at 614-16.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See W. VA. R. CIV. P. 23(a); PA. R. CIV. P. 1702(1)-(5) (requiring that a “class action
provides a fair and efficient method for adjudication of the controversy under the criteria set forth
in Rule 1708” as well); OHIO R. CIV. P. 23(a); TEX. R. CIV. P. 42(a); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §
2023.A; ARK. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
80. See SKEEN, supra note 14, § 3:7.
81. Simpson Housing Solutions, LLC v. Hernandez, 347 S.W.3d 1, 16-16 (Ark. 2009); see
59 AM. JUR. Parties § 73 (2012).
82. Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 627 (3d Cir. 1996).
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least in theory, calls for a closer examination and a higher threshold. It is
not enough that common questions exist; rather, those common questions
must pervade a significant aspect of the pending litigation.83 Because of
this second step, courts often cursorily find commonality while more
thoroughly scrutinizing predominance.84 On the other hand, to the dismay
of the party opposing class certification, many courts will gloss over the
predominance analysis required by Rule 23(b)(3) and simply hark back to
its Rule 23(a) commonality findings, simply restating them in the Rule
23(b)(3) framework.85 For example, the Appalachian states of Ohio,86
Pennsylvania,87 and West Virginia have, for the most part, adopted Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23 to certify class actions in their own courts.88
Therefore, “federal authority is an appropriate aid to interpretation of the
Ohio rule.”89 As noted above, the commonality requirements are not
difficult to satisfy. “If there is a common nucleus of operative facts, or a
common liability issue, the rule is satisfied.”90
For example, in Pennsylvania, the common question of fact means the
facts must be substantially the same so that proof as to one claimant would
be proof as to all.91 But it is also a strong policy of Pennsylvania that
decisions applying the rules for class certification should be made liberally
and in favor of maintaining a class action.92 Likewise, West Virginia and
Ohio have adopted the federal rule for class certification and all three states
maintain that “‘the threshold of ‘commonality’ is not high,’ and ‘requires
only that resolution of the common questions affect all or a substantial
number of the class members.’”93
Rule 23(b)(3) classes are the most frequent type requested by lessors.
The Appalachian states thus require a prospective class to demonstrate that
the common questions predominate – just like the federal rule.94 In
determining whether common questions predominate, they “must represent
83. Amchem Prods., Inc., 521 U.S. at 624.
84. See generally id.
85. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Ohio Sav. Bank, 694 N.E.2d 442, 452 (Ohio 1998).
86. Marks v. C.P. Chem. Co., 509 N.E.2d 1249, 1252 (Ohio 1987).
87. Foodarama Supermarkets v. Am. Ins., 43 Pa. D. & C.4th 467, 495-96 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl.
2000).
88. See Marks, 509 N.E.2d at 1252.
89. Id.
90. Hamilton, 694 N.E.2d at 452.
91. Foodarama Supermarkets, 43 Pa. D. & C.4th at 495.
92. Johnson v. Walsh, No. 09073504, 2011 Phila Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS 317, at *10-11 (Pa. Ct.
Com. Pl. Dec. 2, 2011).
93. See, e.g., In re W. Va. Rezulin Litig. v. Hutchison, 585 S.E.2d 52, 67 (W. Va. 2003)
(quoting Jenkins v. Raymark Indus. Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 472 (5th Cir. 1986)).
94. See Schmidt v. Avco Corp., 473 N.E.2d 822, 824 (Ohio 1984).
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a significant aspect of the case and they must be able to be resolved for all
members of the class in a single adjudication.”95
The existence of individual questions of fact is not fatal, but it is
essential that there be a predominance of common issues, shared by all the
class members, which can be justly resolved in a single proceeding.96 The
standard for showing predominance is more demanding than that for
demonstrating commonality, but not so strict as to vitiate the policy
favoring certification of class actions.97 So long as a class shows that
“adjudication of the common issues in the particular suit has important and
desirable advantages of judicial economy compared to all other issues, or
when viewed by themselves,” they are likely to survive certification
scrutiny.98 In essence, the common issues need not be dispositive, as long
as a single common issue overrides the remaining individual questions.99
Clearly, states have relied heavily on the federal rule to certify class
actions, including traditional oil and gas states such as Texas, Kansas,
Oklahoma, and Arkansas.100 Many courts in oil and gas states have had the
opportunity to assess the commonality and certify classes in property-based
contexts. However, the traditional oil and gas states have had significant
opportunity to examine commonality and class certification where lessors
claim that their royalty payments have not been properly calculated.101
Accordingly, determining how Appalachia and other developing regions,
such as those in North Dakota and Wisconsin, will find commonality
between lessors claiming insufficient royalty payments in the shale context
requires a review of how Appalachian courts and the traditional oil and gas
states have found commonality among such lessors in the past.
V. HISTORICAL REVIEW OF COMMONALITY ASSESSMENT IN
LANDOWNER ROYALTY DISPUTES
Courts have applied a variety of rules to analyze virtually identical
commonality and predominance requirements, yet they have been unable to
agree on a unified method for determining commonality where lessors
allege insufficient royalties.102 Courts in the oil-rich midwest regions of the

95. Id. at 825.
96. Braun v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 24 A.3d 875, 894 (Pa. 2011); Perrine v. E.I. DuPont De
Nemours & Co., 694 S.E.2d 815, 859 (W. Va. 2010).
97. Rezulin, 585 S.E.2d at 67.
98. Id. at 72.
99. See id.
100. See generally Kirk, supra note 56.
101. See, e.g., cases cited infra Part V.
102. See infra Part V.A-C.
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United States have explored multiple frameworks for determining
commonality and predominance in these landowner-royalty cases.103
Interestingly, courts relying on “at the wellhead” determinations of royalty
payments have often relied on the express language of a lease to determine
commonality.104 Other courts, relying more heavily on the marketable
product rule to calculate royalty payments and cost-allocation, are more apt
to use the existence of any common implied covenants within the putative
class members’ leases.105 Increasingly though, courts are taking a more
liberal hybrid approach, applying virtually any available facts to find that
commonality exists.106
As drilling in the shale regions expands, so has related litigation.
Accordingly, it stands to reason that lessors in the shale-laden states will
increasingly inquire into the validity of royalty calculations. As is the case
in other claims when class certification has been assessed, the states are
likely to follow jurisdictional precedent. That review demonstrates that a
court’s assessment of commonality is often in-line with how that court
decides the substantive issue of royalty calculations – examining express
lease provisions or applying implied covenants in a broader way.
A. COMMONALITY IN THE EXPRESS LANGUAGE OF A LEASE
When courts are faced with class certification motions from lessors
claiming improper royalty calculations, some tend to look to the specific
lease provisions that include calculation of costs “at the wellhead” or other
similar language.107 For example, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Arkansas denied class certification based on the express
language of lease provisions.108 In Riedel v. XTO Energy, Inc.,109 the court
noted that individualized inquiries into the leases were necessary in order to
determine whether the agreements were common form contracts.110
Although the plaintiffs had issues in common, those common questions did
not predominate over individual issues based on the express terms of the
contracts.111 In contrast, the Supreme Court of Kansas examined the
express language of royalty provisions in various leases, in conjunction

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

See infra Part V.A-C.
See infra Part V.A.
See infra Part V.B.
See infra Part V.C.
See generally Riedel v. XTO Energy, Inc., 257 F.R.D. 494 (E.D. Ark. 2009).
Id. at 496.
257 F.R.D. 494 (E.D. Ark. 2009).
See generally Riedel, 257 F.R.D. at 512-13.
Id.
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with the defendant gas company’s treatment of those royalty provisions, to
find commonality among lessors in Waechter v. Amoco Production Co.112
In Tana Oil & Gas Corp. v. Bates,113 the Court of Appeals of Texas
certified a class based on identical lease language concerning payment of
royalties on gas production.114 The foregoing analysis has been applied to
class certification motions for suits over royalty disputes from deep drilling,
rather than horizontal drilling, because lease language tends to be formbased.115 Similar language used across the land is bound to affect a
commonality determination, especially where the issue at hand is addressed
expressly in each lease. Interestingly, this Texas court used express lease
provisions to find commonality, just as it used the same express provision
to calculate the royalty substantively.116
B. USE OF IMPLIED COVENANTS TO ASSESS COMMONALITY
In contrast with those examining the express royalty terms of a lease,
some courts use the presence of implied covenants to find predominant,
common issues between oil and gas lessors. These courts often coincide
with those that apply the marketable product rule to the substantive claims
for insufficient royalties. Under this view, courts often rely on the fact that
a defendant gas company is subject to an implied covenant to market to find
that all lessors claiming improper royalty payments have sufficiently
common issues to certify a class.117
For example, the Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed certification of a
class based on an implied covenant to market in Farrar v. Mobil Oil
Corp.118 Specifically, the court held:
in a purported class action claiming improper calculation of
royalties, there is no need to examine individual lease formation
and the intent of the parties thereto for purposes of determining
predominance of common issues or manageability in certification
proceedings where there has been shown a systematic common
course of conduct by an oil and gas lessee in calculating royalties
payable.119

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

537 P.2d 228, 245 (Kan. 1975).
978 S.W.2d 735 (Tex. App. 1998).
Tana Oil & Gas Co., 978 S.W.2d at 738, 742.
See id. at 741-42.
Id.
Smith v. Amoco Prod. Co., 31 P.3d 255 (Kan. 2001).
234 P.3d 19 (Kan. 2010).
Farrar, 234 P.3d at 31.
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Being one of the states that have traditionally calculated royalties based on
the marketable product rule, Kansas kept its commonality assessment in
line with its substantive analysis.120
Similarly, the New Mexico Supreme Court upheld certification of a
class based solely on the existence of an implied duty of marketability.121
In Davis v. Devon Energy Corp.,122 the court held that when such a duty is
implied in law, it does not require reliance on individualized evidence of the
parties’ express agreements and thus provides sufficient commonality to
certify a class.123 Again, the existence of implied responsibility was
sufficient to connect the leases as a class.124
Courts have even used the existence of implied covenants to deny
certification of a class.125 In Stirman v. Exxon Corp.,126 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s
certification of a class based on an implied covenant to market.127 The
district court had found commonality based on the “reasonably prudent
operator standard” of the implied covenant to market.128 However, the Fifth
Circuit held the class certification order was an abuse of discretion because
the law regarding implied covenants to market was not uniform across the
jurisdictions involved in the case.129 That lack of uniformity created
individual issues that predominated over common issues.
C. A HYBRID EXAMINATION: EXPRESS LANGUAGE
AND IMPLIED COVENANTS
While some certification decisions have been made by depending
solely on the express language of the leases and others have been made by
focusing specifically on the existence of an implied covenant, still other
courts have applied hybrid methods. These courts tend to assess and
consider a variety of approaches taken by courts in drill-heavy regions to
determine whether or not a class of lessors should be certified.
Accordingly, they end up applying a myriad of methods to certify a class.
These hybrids demonstrate that, where a court is liberally approaching class
120. See id.
121. Davis v. Devon Energy Corp., 218 P.3d 75, 84-87 (N.M. 2009).
122. 218 P.3d 75 (N.M. 2009).
123. Davis, 218 P.3d at 84-87.
124. Id.
125. See, e.g., Stirman v. Exxon Corp., 280 F.3d 554, 566 (5th Cir. 2002).
126. 280 F.3d 554 (5th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added).
127. Stirman, 280 F.3d at 556.
128. Id. at 559-60 (quoting Feb. 22, 2001 Order at 2, Sitrman v. Exxon, 280 F.3d 544 (5th
Cir. 2002) (No. SA-99-CA-0763)).
129. Id. at 566.
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certification, it tends to examine any means possible of finding common
predominant issues.
For example, the Supreme Court of Texas has expanded beyond its
own express-language view to consider implied covenants as well.130 In
Bowden v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,131 the Texas Supreme Court denied
certification of one class based on a duty to market because some leases
contained express clauses as to the duty to market, and some did not.132
The Bowden court also denied certification to a second class based on
reasonableness of fees under “percentage of the proceeds” contracts,
because the class included both proceeds and market value leases.133 The
royalty owners asserted that the contracts established a duty to administer
the lease as a reasonably prudent operator under both lease forms, but the
court held that “market value leases provide an objective basis for
calculating royalties independent of the price the lessee actually obtains,”
while proceeds leases relied on implied covenants, so commonality was
lacking.134 However, the Bowden court did agree to certify a third class
based on the uniform language of pricing provisions in Gas Royalty
Agreements.135
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed class certification
based on the defendant’s course of conduct in allegedly defrauding the class
members.136 In SEECO, Inc. v. Hales,137 certification was not expressly
based on contract language or implied covenants, but the court did confirm
that individual differences in the language of the leases were not sufficient
to override the common scheme or prevent class certification.138 The court
noted that its order would not eliminate the need for each class member to
show reliance on the alleged fraud.139 However, the alleged fraudulent
scheme of the defendant constituted a “single course of fraudulent
conduct,” which served as a common starting point for the claims of all
class members.140
130. Bowden v. Phillips Petrol. Co., 247 S.W.3d 690, 708-09 (Tex. 2008).
131. 247 S.W.3d 690 (Tex. 2008).
132. Bowden, 247 S.W.3d at 690, 708-09.
133. Id. at 694-95.
134. Id. at 707, 709.
135. Id. at 702-08.
136. SEECO, Inc. v. Hales, 954 S.W.2d 234, 240-41 (Ark. 1997).
137. 954 S.W.2d 234 (Ark. 1997).
138. SEECO, Inc., 954 S.W.2d at 237 (“The evidence produced by the plaintiffs indicates:
an alleged overall scheme and course of conduct by the defendants designed to defraud the
members of the proposed class as a group irrespective of the type of oil and gas lease or the
volume of production from the leases.”).
139. Id. at 240-41.
140. Id.
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Undoubtedly, when a class certification request is brought before a
court, a lessee will struggle to know exactly what factors may play into the
determinations of commonality and predominance, even in the face of these
three approaches. In one instance, the specific language used in the express
terms of each lease may be reviewed and, if the language used to calculate
royalty payments is sufficiently similar, a court may find a common
question that predominates over any individual payment issues.141 In
another instance, a court may ignore express language and instead
determine whether, in that jurisdiction, the lessee was subject to an implied
duty to market the gas produced such that all lessors’ improper royalty
claims are common and can be considered together.142 In still other
situations, the court may justify examination of both express terms of the
lease and any existing implied covenants.143
However, while all of these options exist, it is apparent that these
trends tend to coincide with a jurisdiction’s method of determining the
substantive royalty calculations claims. Accordingly, courts likely will
apply similar logic to substantive royalty claims and commonality for class
certification of those claims in Appalachian shale leases. However, before
concluding how courts are likely to rule, it is also helpful to consider how
those courts have addressed commonality in a similar arena – that of
general contract-based claims – to determine whether a greater trend exists.
VI. CONTRACT-BASED CLASS ACTIONS
When asked to certify a class in cases involving breach of contract
claims, Appalachian courts will often maintain a low threshold for
commonality and even cede its existence, where the contracts are
substantially the same.144
Specifically, “[c]laims arising from
interpretations of a form contract generally give rise to common
questions.”145 Moreover, “[c]ourts . . . generally find that a wide variety of
claims may be established by common proof in cases involving similar
form documents or the use of standardized procedures and practices.”146
The inclination to find predominance of common issues in standardform contract cases was reiterated by the Supreme Court of Ohio in
141. See discussion supra Part V.A.
142. See discussion supra Part V.B.
143. See discussion supra Part V.C.
144. Dearlove v. Genzyme Transgenics Corp., 70 Pa. D. & C.4th 314, 324 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl.
2004); Shaver v. Standard Oil Co., 623 N.E.2d 602, 605 (Ohio App. 1993) (“By providing
standardized lease agreements which were uniformly imposed on the dealers by [the lessee,
appellants meet] the threshold requirement of commonality.”).
145. Janicik v. Prudential Ins. Co., 451 A.2d 451, 457 (Pa. 1982).
146. Cope v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 696 N.E.2d 1001, 1004 (Ohio 1998).
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Hamilton v. Ohio Savings Bank.147 In Hamilton, the Supreme Court of
Ohio held that a “class action . . . is appropriate where the claims arise from
standardized forms or routinized procedures, notwithstanding the need to
prove reliance.”148 Thus, there is a likelihood that commonality in proposed
classes where identical contracts are at issue will be found.149 But disparate
contracts will not necessarily preclude class certification, provided that the
underlying legal issues are substantially the same or where similar practices
are used.150
When one Ohio trial court denied a motion for class certification based
upon a finding that predominant commonality was lacking due to differing
contracts, the Court of Appeals of Ohio found an abuse of discretion and
certified the class.151 “Although [appellee] used different contracts, there
was clearly a ‘common nucleus of fact.’”152 The Hadley court emphasized
a preference to grant commonality liberally by certifying the proposed
class, even where individual contracts contained certain discrete terms.153
Likewise, Pennsylvania courts have found commonality based on different
contracts so long as “the relevant contractual provisions raise common
questions of law and fact and do not differ materially.”154 West Virginia
has followed similar principles, stating “a common nucleus of operative fact
or law is usually enough to satisfy the commonality requirement.”155
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has also stated that
proposed class members must present evidence that the terms of the alleged
contract were ascertainable and definitive in nature.156 In cases where later
refinement of the issues reveals that seemingly similar contractual
provisions merit differing interpretations, the court may create appropriate
subclasses.157 However, these subclasses do not defeat the original
determination that commonality is present.
When applied to lessor class actions for insufficient royalty payments,
these liberal decisions imply that other courts would find commonality just
as easily in lease contracts. Even in contract-based claims regarding

147. 694 N.E.2d 442, 452 (Ohio 1998).
148. Hamilton, 694 N.E.2d at 456.
149. See id.
150. See generally Estate of Reed v. Hadley, 839 N.E.2d 55, 62 (Ohio App. 2005).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 62-63.
154. Dearlove v. Genzyme Transgenics Corp., 70 Pa. D. & C.4th 314, 324 (Pa. Ct. Cm. Pl.
2004) (citing Janicik v. Prudential Ins. Co., 451 A.2d 451, 457 (Pa. 1982)).
155. State of W. Va. ex rel. Chemtall Inc. v. Madden, 607 S.E.2d 772, 781 (W. Va. 2004).
156. Ways v. Imation Enters. Corp., 589 S.E.2d 36, 43 (W. Va. 2003).
157. Janicik v. Prudential Ins. Co., 451 A.2d 451, 457 (Pa. 1982).
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different individual contracts, these courts have consistently found that, so
long as there is a common nucleus of operative fact, this prerequisite is
easily satisfied.158 When this liberality is considered alongside the growing
trend to find commonality in property-based lessor class actions, it seems
clear that shale lessees should expect similar treatment from courts.159
As noted earlier, Rule 23(b)(3) requires putative class members to
demonstrate that the questions of law or fact common to the class
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.160
While Appalachian courts will allow a permissive application of
commonality in breach of contract claims, sporadically this same group of
courts will set a higher threshold for predominance in those same
scenarios.161 In Ohio, standardized contracts have been a strong indicator
of commonality. Differing contracts have warranted evidence of a common
nucleus of operative fact, but the predominance requirement is construed
more narrowly. In Hinkston v. Sunstar Acceptance Corp.,162 the Court of
Appeals of Ohio held that where “each transaction is different, depending
on such things as the business practice of [the seller] and the customer’s
ability to negotiate, an individual inquiry into each transaction is
necessary.”163 The Hinkston court concluded that predominance was not
met, because questions affecting individual class members predominated
over common questions.164
Importantly, the mere existence of differing forms of contracts does not
defeat predominance without any indication as to the materiality of any
differences.165 When answering the predominance question in a contractbased certification motion, courts often examine each of the contracts in
question and determine whether the common elements of the contracts are
more pervasive than the differences.166 The existence of boilerplate
language in these contracts is also used to establish predominance of

158. See Chemtall, 607 S.E.2d at 781.
159. Compare Part V.A-C, with Part VI.
160. See generally Kirk, supra note 56.
161. See supra Part IV.
162. Nos. C-990681, C-990701, 2000 WL 1886388 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2000).
163. Hinkston, 2000 WL 1886388, at *16.
164. Id.
165. Estate of Reed v. Hadley, 839 N.E.2d 55, 64 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005).
166. Id. at 64 (“[A] claim will meet the predominance requirements when there exists a
generalized evidence which proves or disproves an element on a simultaneous, class-wide basis,
since such proof obviates the need to examine each class member’s individual position.” (citation
omitted)); Janicik v. Prudential Ins. Co., 451 A.2d 451, 456 (Pa. 1982) (“[C]lass actions may be
maintained even when the claims of members are based on different contracts so long as the
relevant contractual provisions raise common questions of law and fact and do not differ
materially.” (citation omitted)).
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common issues in courts.167 In essence, to determine that “class
certification is improper simply because members of the proposed class
signed different contracts” is considered an erroneous analysis.168
Although some differing language is used in the respective rules for
class action certification and maintenance across the Appalachian states,
these courts actually address the issue in somewhat similar fashions. In
each state, commonality bears a low threshold, often meriting only a
cursory glance to acknowledge that at least a single common question of
law and fact exists among the members of the proposed class.169 This is
especially true in cases where there is a single form contract, although
disparate contracts do not necessarily preclude certification so long as they
are fundamentally similar.170 The consideration for predominance is
generally stricter than that for commonality, yet not applied in a
comfortably consistent manner across, or even within, the states. Provided
that one or more of the claims at issue stem from a “common nucleus of
operative fact,” courts will often maintain classes in the interest of efficient
adjudication.171
VII. COMMONALITY FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION IN
LANDOWNER ROYALTY DISPUTES
While review of class certification trends demonstrates that states
largely apply the same rules and requirements as Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23 to certify a class, how those jurisdictions go about supporting
the existence of each requirement is not so uniform. The methods by which
these jurisdictions choose to analyze the common issues at play in any
given class action are not consistent, and they generally depend on how a
court would assess the substantive royalty claim underlying the certification
request. Accordingly, a party should examine how the courts may calculate
royalties to determine whether it is likely to certify a class. Moreover,
parties may take hints from the way other contract-based claims have been
handled.
In the growing context of horizontal drilling, whether or not a pooling
agreement exists, all evidence points to the likelihood that courts will apply

167. See State ex rel. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Starcher, 474 S.E.2d 186, 189 (W. Va. 1996)
(“[T]he breach of contract claim . . . [is] based upon proof of the standard form documents utilized
by the defendant in its processing . . . and the standardized rules, procedures and conduct of the
defendant in handling these matters.”).
168. Hadley, 839 N.E.2d at 66.
169. See supra Part IV.
170. See, e.g., Hadley, 839 N.E.2d at 64.
171. See State of W. Va. ex rel. Chemtall, 607 S.E.2d, 722, 781 (W. Va. 2004).
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the implied covenant to market against any lessee and find that all leases
bearing similar language under which the lessee is subject to this covenant
will have common issues. Additionally, these trends show that while
predominance of those common issues can be hard to establish, it is not
impossible. Moreover, the rigor a court may employ in assessing
predominance in any particular case cannot be comfortably predicted.
Where pooling agreements exist to link lessors, however, it may be more
easily established.
The growing trend in royalty calculation assessment leans toward use
of the marketable product rule.172 Impliedly, this means, as long as the
implied covenant to market is applicable, lessees will be required to pay
royalties without deductions for production and transportation costs,
regardless of differences in leasing and pooling structures in horizontal
drilling. States like West Virginia have not only adopted the marketable
product rule, they have made it expressly clear that lessees are not able to
transfer the costs of production or transportation onto lessors, regardless of
the inclusion of “at the wellhead” language in any given lease provision.173
The fact that such adamant holdings exist demonstrates that implied
covenants and other surrounding circumstances will play a large part in
commonality determinations for class certification as well.
As courts in the shale regions face more and more putative class
actions for claims of improper royalty payments, they will have a plethora
of information to ponder in determining whether or not the lessors bring
common, predominant claims to the table. They will be able to review
traditional methods of examining royalty calculation claims from traditional
oil and gas states, as well as in other shale regions. They will have the
opportunity to consider express terms and provisions included in their
leases, as well as the existence of any implied covenants underlying each
lease. Additionally, they will be able to compare property-based class
action requests with those that are contract-based.
This review
demonstrates that while a variety of methods have been applied in the past,
a clear trend is forming: courts are construing commonality and
predominance liberally and using far reaching information to certify a class,
rather than restrict their review to specific, narrow facts.
In the context of property-based royalty payment claims, courts are
considering express language, implied covenants, and other surrounding
circumstances, rather than adhering only to an examination of express terms
of a lease or only applying covenants implied in law. Where commonality
172. See supra Part V.
173. See Estate of Tawney v. Columbia Natural Res., LLC, 633 S.E.2d 22, 30 (W. Va. 2006).
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exists between the express language of a royalty term, such as a calculation
made “at the wellhead,” courts are often willing to certify classes as long as
this language constitutes a predominant, common nucleus of operative fact
within the lessors’ claims.174 Certification also occurs where predominant
commonality exists because the lessee is subject to implied covenants to
market or produce the gas drilled from the lessors’ property.175 This
indicates that as the Appalachian shale region continues to develop, lessors
filing suit, who are bound by form leases containing identical or
substantially similar royalty clauses, are likely to be certified as a class. It
also shows that where the lessees are obligated to market or produce the gas
drilled as implied by law, lessors claiming that their royalties are calculated
incorrectly will be able to certify a class, regardless of lease language.
Certification may be met at an even lower threshold when the common
leases also contain pooling agreements, because it can be argued that the
lessee has essentially created a contract establishing commonality between
those specific lessors.176 And as review of contract-based class actions
shows, courts are willing to certify where terms are merely similar, rather
than identical.177
In those contract-based claims, commonality is also found on the basis
of party’s duty or prior practices.178 Admittedly, property-based claims are
not always handled the same as the contract-based claims even though a
lease is a form of contract.179 However, the fact that courts are handling
both genres with similar liberality demonstrates that they are not likely to
except shale or other horizontal drilling leases from this trend.
Accordingly, a lessee should expect that if lessors bring a claim for
improper royalty calculations as a class action, the existence of form royalty
provisions, pooling agreements, standard protocols for issuing royalty
payments, as well as statutory and common law covenants, can all be used
to establish a class.
VIII.CONCLUSION
This Article has reviewed general principles of oil and gas leases, as
well as the legal theories applied to royalty calculations. The Article has
also examined how courts have traditionally certified a class of lessors
alleging insufficient royalty payments and how that process may mirror or
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

See supra Part V.A.
See supra Part V.B.
See supra Part II.D.5.
See Part VI.
See Part VI.
Compare Part V, with Part VI.
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differ from the certification of other contract-based claims. Most
importantly, this Article has demonstrated that when all of these factors are
considered, courts are likely to apply the same principles to certify a lessor
class in shale royalty disputes, regardless of the differences that the
horizontal drilling form presents.
Shale drilling methods differ significantly from past drilling methods
and have the potential to reach many mineral interest owners from a single
well pad. Also, the use of pooling agreements is more prevalent, unifying
lessors even more than in the past. In conjunction with growing trends that
apply the marketable product rule and liberally construe the commonality
requirement of class certification, there can be no doubt that a lessee will
need to construe its royalty payment just as it has in the past. Technology
may have evolved to benefit production, but this evolution is unlikely to
affect the percentages owed or the costs allocated to the average lessor upon
production.

